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This new model can be used to derive the financeable fiscal defi-
cit, given inflation targets, or to derive an equilibrium inflation
rate for which no fiscal adjustment would be necessary. Here it
is used to analyze inflation, external debt, and financial sector
reform in Turkey.
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Macroeconomic  AdJustment
and Grovwth
This new model uses an integrated framework to  * Financial sector reforms that affect base
assess the consistency between fiscal deficits  money demand.
and other macroeconomic targets, such as output
growth and the rate of inflation.  It can be used  *  Changes in interest rates paid on foreign
to derive Llte  financeable fiscal deficit, given  and domestic public sector debt.
inflation targets, or to derive an equilibrium
inflation rate for which no fiscal adjustment  *  Output growth targets.
would  be necessary.
E  -Exchange  rate policy.
The "financeable deficit'  is the deficit that
does not require more financing than is compat-  The model was used to analyze the relation-
ible with sustainable extemal and intemal  ship between inflation, extemal debt, and
borrowing and existing targets for inflation and  financial sector refomn in Turkey.
output growth.
The model can also be used to see what
The model can assess how the relationship  happens if the required fiscal adjustment is
between fiscal adjustment and sustained infla-  postponed.  The authors explore two scenarios:
tion rates are affected by:  one in which fiscal adjustment takes place
eventually, and one in which the inflation tax is
used eventually to close any financing gap.
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1  Introduction
This  paper  presents  and  applies  an integrated  framework  to assess  the
consistency  between  fiscal  deficits  and  other  macroeconomic  targets,  in
particular  output  growth  and the  rate  of inflation.  The model  centers
around  the  government  budget  constraint  and  can  be used to either  derive
the "financea-ble"  deficit  given  inflation  targets,  or to derive  an
equilibrium  inflation  rate for  which  no fiscal  adjustment  would  be
necessary.  The financeable  deficit  is defined  as the  deficit  that  does  not
require  more financing  than is compatible  with sustainable  external  and
internal  borrowing,  and  existing  targets  for inflation  and  output  growth.
The  model  can  assess  the impact  of financial  sectcr  reforms  affecting  base
money  demand,  of  changes  in interest  rates  paid on foreign  and domestic
public  sector  debt,  of output  growth  targets  and  of exchange  rate  policy
on the  relation  between  fiscal  adjustment  and sustainable  inflation  rates.
Finally,  the  model  can  also  be used to see  what  happens  if the  required
fiscal  adjustment  is  postponed.  We explore  two  alternatives:  one  where
fiscal  adjustment  takes  place  eventually,  and  one  where  the inflation  tax
is  used eventually  to close  any financing  gap  once  debt issue  is
discontinued.  The  model  is applied  to  an analysis  of inflation,  external
debt  and financial  sector  reform  in Turkey.
The framework  is  based  on the  nublic  finance  approach  to inflation.
In this  approach  (  see  Phelps  (  1973),  Dornbusch  (  1977),  and  Buiter
(1983,  1985),  among  others),  inflation  is interpreted  as the  residual  tax.
Residual  because  it restores  balance  between  the  expenditure  plans  of the
public  sector,  its  debt  managemenc  and revenues  from traditional  sources
of taxation.  Inflation  acts as a tax  because  it forces  the  private  sector3
to reduce  expenditure  just to maintain  the  real  value  of money  balances  it
desires  to hold for  a given  rate-of-return  structure.  It drives  a wedge
between  income  and  expenditure  not  offset  by any  real accumulation  of
assets,  just like  any  other  tax  does.  Also,  since  its  counterpart  is
Central  Bank  advances  to the  public  sector,  it allows  the  public  sector  to
cover  a matching  excess  of expenditure  over  more traditional  sources  of
revenue.
This approach  does  not deny  the fact  that,  in the  short  run, demand
pressure  or cost-push  factors  such  as nominal  exchange  rate  changes  may  be
more important  determinants  of inflation.  However,  such factors  contribute
little  to the  understanding  of sustained  inflation.  Excess  demand
pressure,  as Friedman  poirts  out in  his  celebrated  presidential  address  (
Friedman  (  1968)),  should  lead  to accelerating  rather  than sustained
inflation.  Cost-push  factors  such  as  wage or exchange  rate  changes  can
explain  price  level  shifts  but not really  sustained  inflation.  Of course
continued  nominal  devaluation  could  explain  a matching  excess  of domestic
over  foreign  inflation,  but such  an explanation  begs the  question  of  what
is  behind  the  apparent  need to resort  to such  a continued policy  of
nominal  devaluation.  A similar  objection  can  be raised  against  strict
monetarist  explanations  of inflation.  The  claim  that  sustained  inflation
is  not possible  without  a matching  growth  in nominal  balances  is almost
tautologically  true since  otherwise  the  real  money  stock  would  go off
towards  zero  or infinity.  It  however  begs the  question  of what drives  such
a  process  of sustained  monetization.
To explain  sustained  inflation  rates,  an analysis  of the fiscal
implications  of sustained  inflation  is  necessary,  and this  is what the
fiscal  apprcach  to inflation  does.  This  approach  has received  renewed4
attention  after  an influential  paper  by Sargent  and  Wallace (  1982),  who
used this  view on inflation  to explain  paradoxical  links  between  inflation
and  money  growth  sometimes  observed  in  practice  (cf  Bruno  et al. (1988)
for  several  examples).  The concept  of sustainability  plays  an important
role in their  analysis.  Sustainability  of inflation  targets  requires
consistency  between  those  inflation  targets  and their  implied  consequences
for revenues  from  the inflation  tax  on the  one  hand,  and on the  other  hand
the  public  sector's  surplus  of expenditure  over other  sources  of revenues.
This  analysis  has  been extended  to the  open  economy  so as to allow
discussion  of exchange  rate  policy  in Drazen  and  Helpman  (  1987)  and  van
Wijnbergen  (1986,1988).
It is arguable  that the  exchange  rate  policy  followed  in  many
moderate  and  high inflation  countries  has increased  the relevance  of the
public  finance  approach  to inflation.  Moderate  and  high inflation  has
forced  many countries  to  offset  inflation  differentials  with trading
partners  by nominal  devaluation  to avoid  disruption  of real trade  flows.
However,  such  a policy  eliminates  the  role  of the  exchange  rate as a
"nominal"  anchor,  since  any  blip in the  price level  will be offset
automatically  by a matching  exchange  rate  adjustment.  If in  addition
monetary  policy  is  accommodating  through  the  Central  Bank's  inability  to
resist  monetization  of fiscal  deficits,  no monetary  anchors  are left.  In
such  circumstances  the  public  finance  approach  to inflation  might  even
become  relevant  for the  explanation  of short  run inflation,  not  just for
medium  trends.
But  even if  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime  is  adhered  to,  the approach
suggested  here is  relevant.  A fixed  exchange  rate  regime  (or,  more
generally,  a predetermined  exchange  rate  regime)  implies  a medium  term5
inflation  rate:  foreign  inflation  plus the  rate  of nominal  devaluation
embedded  ir the  exchange  rate regime  (  zero  if it is a truly  fixed
regime).  Consistency  between  the  inflation  rate implied  by the  exchange
rate  policy  followed  and  fiscal  policy  is important.  Empirical  evidence
shows  conclusively  that the  absence  of such  consistency  is  an important
determinant  of lack  of credibility  and the  eventual  collapse  of a fixed
exchange  rate regime  (  Cumby  and  van Wijnbergen  (  1987)).  Hence  the
approach  sugggested  in this  paper  could  be used to assess  sustainability
of a fixed  exchange  rate  regime.
In  what follows  we first  present  the  analytical  framework  that
underlies  the  model.  We then  provide  the  empirical  analysis  necessary
before  the  model  can  be applied.  This  analysis  and the  associated  data
requirements  are greatly  simplified  by the  approach's  focus  on consistency
rather  than  on intertemporal  optimality.  We then  proceed  to apply  the
framework  to an analysis  of external  debt,  financial  sector  reform,
inflation  and fiscal  policy  in  Turkey.
2  Analytical  Framework
2.1  Fiscal  Deficits,  Money  Creation  and  Debt.
This Section  explores  the  link  between  fiscal  deficits,  money
creation  and  debt.  First,  the  analysis  focuses  on the  precise  measuremenu
of the  public  sector's  net  claim  on real resources  (  the "real"  or
"operational'  deficit),  and  on the  ways it can  be financed.  Then the
implications  for  feasible  financing  of given  macroeconomic  targets  for
inflation  and output  growth,  of changes  in financial  sector  regulatory
policies  and  of interest  rates  abroad  and  at home are  explored.6
To derive  the  relation  between  fiscal  deficits,  money  creation  and
debt,  start  from  the '  llowing  relation:
(la)  D + i  B  + i*B E  - B  + B  E +  DC
- B  +(B  -NFA  )E + DC  + NFA E
g
The left  hand side  of (1)  lists  the  expenses  (net  of taxes)  of the  public
sector:  its  non-interest  deficit  D  plus nominal  interest  payments  on
domestic  and foreign  debt.  i (i )  is the  nominal  interest  rate  on domestic
(foreign)  debt B (B ).  NFA is the  dollar  value  of the  Central  Bank's  net
foreign  assets.  E is the  nominal  exchange  rate (TL  per  dollar).  These
expenses  need to  be covered  by the issue  of domestic  or foreign  debt (B
and B ),  plus  Central  Bank  advances  to the  public  sector,  DCg.  The
non-interest  deficit  D and the  interest  payments  should  include  the
non-interest  deficit  and interest  obligations  of all government  entities:
the  central  government,  state  enterprises,  munici..  lities,  local
governments,  and extra-budgetary  funds.  The  proper  treatment  of the
Central  Bank is  discussed  below;  its  obligations  too should  be included.
Two changes  to (la)  help to bring  out the  link  between  money
financing  and public  sector  deficits.  First  consider  introducing  base
money.  Increases  in  base  money,  M, equal  the increase  in net  domestic
credit  to the government,  DCg,  and increases  in  n,et  foreign  assets  of the
Central  Bank,  nfa E,  minus  the increase  in the  Central  Bank's  net worth.
Therefore  base  money  can  be seen  as a source  of revenue  to the  government.7
This suggests  the  proper  definition  of money for  an analysis  of deficit
finance.  Clearly,  revenue  derived  from  inflationary  erosion  of the  private
sector's  deposits  that is offset  by inflationary  erosion  of loans
outstar.ding  to the  private  sector  does  not increase  NET revenue.  Hence the
need to  use base  money  or "inside  money"  only (  See  Anand  and  van
Wijnbergen  (  1989)  on  how to deal  with such  real  world complitations  as
Central  Bank's  credit  to the  private  sector  and so on).  Reserve  or base
money  equals  currency  in circulation  and (  net) reserves  held  by
commercial  banks  at the  Central  Bank.  These  components  form  the  net
liabilities  of the  Central  Bank towards  the  private  sector.  However,
counting  all of the  Central  Bank's  liabilities  (base  money)  as a  public
sector  liability  means  that  of the  Central  Bank's  assets,  the  claims  on
non-government  agencs  neeC to  be subtracted  from  the  public  sector's  debt.
In  particular,  the  public  sector's  foreign  debt  needs  to be measured  NET
of the  Central  Bank's  foreign  assets  (i.e.  public  sector  foreign  debt
equals  B -NFA  ).
The second  change  involves  the  Central  Bank's  profit  and loss
account.  If in addition  the  Central  Bank's  profit  and loss  account  is
included  into  the  definition  of the  public  sector,  che  link  between
deficits  and  money  financing  becomes  watertight.  In a simplified  set-up,
the  Central  Bank's  profits  consist  of interest  earnings  on reserves,
i NFA ,  which it could  either  add  to its  foreign  assets with as
counterpart  an increase  in  net  worth,  or transfer  to the fiscal
authorities.  For  presentational  purposes  we assurae  the first  option  in
this  Section,  but alternatives  are straightforward  to  work out.  The first
*  *
option  implies:  i  NFA E  =NW.  Subtracting that  expression  from  the  budget8
identity  yields:
*  *  *  . *  *  . .*
(lb)  D + i  B  + i (B -NFA)  E-  B + (B  -NFA  )E  + DC  + NFA E - NW
- B  + (B  -NFA )E +  M
The importance  of the inclusion  of the  Central  Bank in the
comprehensive  public  sector  accounts  cannot  be stressed  enough.  Examples
are  rife  where  countries  run  a balanced  budget,  sometimes  under the  force
of a constitutional  amendment,  but in fact  continue  deficit  spending  by
effectively  shifting  Treasury  expenditure  to the  Central  Bank.
Further  modifications  to (1)  are  necessary  to tighten  the  link
between  the  public  sector's  net claim  on resourcez  to increases  in the
real  value  of domestic  and foreign  debt,  to inflation  and to  money
creation.  The  most important  one  involves  incorporating  capital  losses  due
to inflation  and  exchange  rate  changes  into  the  accounting  framework.
Making  this  correction  to equ. (1)  results  in the  following  link  between
deficits  and inflation  (see  Anand  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989)  for  a  more
detailed  analysis  of the  steps  involved):
(2)  d +  rb +  (r  +e)(b -nfa  )e  - b +  ((b  nfa )e)  +  M/P
- b +  ((b  -nfa  )e)  +  m +  Pm'/
'We  use the following  Identity  in the  derivation  of (2):
((b  nfa*)e)  - (b -nfa  )e  +  e(b -nfa  )e9
Lower  case letters  denote  real  variables,  so d - D/P, the  real  value  of
the  non-interest  deficit;  P (P ) is the  domestic  (foreign)  price  level.  P
A* 
(P )  is the  corresponding  domestic  (foreign)  inflation  rates. b (  b ) is
the  real  value  of domestic  (  foreign)  debt in terms  of domestic  ( foreign)
goods,  and  m is the  real  money stock  H/P. nfa  is the real  value  of the
banking system's  net foreign  assets  in terms  of foreign  go-
nfa -NFA  /P  . r ( r ) is the real rate of interest: r - i - P, r  - i  -
A*~~~~~~~~~~~ 
P . e is the real  exchange  rate,  e - EP /P.  e is the  rate of depreciation
of  the  : -i exchange  rate.  A "  *  n  indicates  chqnges  in the  variable  ielow
it.  Finally,  n denotes  the  real  growth  rate  of the  economy.
Equ (2)  states  that the  fiscal  deficit,  inclusive  of the  Central
Bank's  profit  and loss  account,  but counting  REAL interest  payments  only,
equals  changes  in the  real  value  of domestic  and  foreign  debt,  plus
A
revenue  from  the inflation  tax (  Pm)  and from  seignorage  m (with  unitary
income  elasticity  of demand  for  m, m - nm in  steady  state  ).  The sum  of
the  latter  two  equal  revenue  from  monetization,  M/P.  Outside  steady  state
there  could  be other  sources  of revenue  from  monetization  than  these  two:
once-off  changes  in the  real  money  stock  because  of changes  in inflation
or interest  rates,  or similar  once-off  changes  due to financial
innovations  shifting  mone) .emand.
Equation  (2)  as it stands  is nothing  but accounting,  but it is at the
basis  of most of the  analysis  to come.  Macroeconomic  variables  such  as
growth  and inflation  have implications  for  the amount  of money  the  private
sector  is  willing  to absorb  for  given  interest  rates.  Similarly,  changes
in financiai  structure  and  regulation  will also  have  an impact  on the
amount  of revenue  from  monetization  that  can  be expected.  All such10
restr4ctions  con  be incorporated  in  equ. (2).  This is  explored  in Section
2.2.  Section  2.3 then  puts  it all together  to derive  the  constraints  on
fiscal  policy  that  consistency  with financial  structure  and  macroeconomic
targets  implies.
2.2  Revenue  from  Monetization  and the  Structure  of the  Financial  Sector.
The  previous  section  argued  that  the  appropriate  money  concept  to use
is  net Central  Bank liabilities  to the  private  sector,  or reserve  money.
It is thus important  to understand  how demand  for  base  money  responds  to
changes  in financial  sector  regulation,  to interest:  rates  and inflation
and so on.  This creates  a practical  problem  in  that those  liabilities  are
towards  different  agents  in the  economy.  It is therefore  unlikely  that  an
aggregate  money  demand  function  would adequately  capture  the  sensitivity
of reserve  money  demand  with respect  to changes  in the  Inflation  rate,
financial  structure  and interest  rates.  We use a  more structural  approach
in this  paper.  Underlying  this  approach  is  a model  describing  private
portfolio  choice  as a function  of inflation,  output  growth  and interest
rates.  This gives  the  amount  of currency,  demand  deposits  and time
deposits  the  private  sector  is  willing  to  hold given  output,  inflation  and
interest  rates.  This is coupled  with a simple  financial  sector  model
Ancorporating  reserve  requirements  and  other  bank regulatory  policies  to
derive  the  demand  for  reserves  by commercial  banks.  The  demand  for
reserves  is then  added  to the  demand  for  currency  already  derived  to get
an estimate  of the  total  demand  for  base  money  given  inflation,  interest
rates  and  so on.  All this is then  used to calculate  revenue  from
monetization  for  different  inflation  rates,  output  growth  rates,  interest11
and inflation  rates  and different  regulatory  policies.
This indirect,  structural  approach  has a number  of advantages.  It
allows  explicit  calculation  of the  effects  of changes  in financial  sector
regulation  on the  financeable  deficit  through  the impact  of such
regulation  on the  aggregate  demand  for  base  money.  For the  same  reason,
this approach  is  more likely  to  be stable  across  changes  in financial
sector  regulation.  Below  we give  an example  for  a simple  fractional
reserve  banking  system  (  ie a system  where  banks  are  required  to  hold a
fraction  of their  deposits  as reserves).  More  complicated  regulatory
systems  are incorporated  as an option  in the  LOTUS  model  that is  available
on diskette  as a companion  to this  paper.
To analyse  the  determinants  of the  demand  for  the  primary  components
of reserve  money  entering  into  such  a financial  sector  model,  consider
first  a simple  portfolio  approach  to  private  sector  asset  demand:
A
(3b)  (DD/(PY))  - fDD(P'iDD'iTD)
A
(3c)  (TD/(PY)) - fTD(P'i  DD'  iTD)
Demand  for  currency  Cu,  demand  deposits  DD,  and  time  deposits  TD,  all as a
share  of nominal  GNP (PY  in the  formula),  depend  on inflation  P, and the
interest  rates  paid on demand  and time  deposits,  iDD  and iTD.  More
sophisticated  financial  structures  would introduce  additional  factors.  For
example,  with foreign  exchange  deposits  available  one  would  expect
exchange  rate depreciation  and foreign  interest  rates  to influence  demand12
for  domestic  assets.  However  the  time  period  since  the  introduction  of
foreign  exchange  deposits  in Turkey  has  been too  short  to allow
econometric  analysis  of the  influence  of such  factors  in the  empirical
application  discussed  below.
Under  a fractional  reserve  system,  with reserve  requirement  ratios
RR.DD  and  RR  TD against  demand  and  time  deposits  respectively,  demand  for
base  money  M is:
(4)  M/(PY)  - Cu/(PY)  +  RRDDD/(PY) +  TDTD/(PY)
A  A  A
- cu  (Pji  DDiTD) +  RRDDfDD(P,iDD,iTD)  +  RRTDfTD(PiDDiTD)
(4)  can  be used to derive  the impact  of chenges  in inflation,  interest
rates  and  financial  sector  regulation  on base  money  demand  and their
likely  impact  on the revenue  the  public  sector  can  expect  from
monetization.  Combining  this informatioQi  with equ. (2)  then  allows
assessment  of the fiscal  consequences  of inflation  and  of financial  sector
reforms  affecting  for  example  reserve  requirements  RRDD  and  RRTD or.  the
interest  rates  paid on deposits.
2.3  Putting  it  all together:  on the  design  of consistent  fiscal  policies
The  cost and  availability  of foreign  financing  are  clearly  important
determinants  of what constitutes  a consistent  fiscal  policy.  Required
financing  depends  on the  cost of the  existing  foreign  debt,  r (b -nfa  )e;
in  addition,  for  any total  revenue  requirement,  the  amount  to be covered13
from domestic  sources  depends  on the  amount  of foreign  financing  (b -nfa)e
that is desired,  or, if less,  available.
Assessing  a country's  room  for  external  borrowing  involves  two
considerations:  solvency  and  creditworthiness,  Solvency  concerns  ability
to  pay and is intricately  linked  to the  non-interest  current  account,  ,eal
interest  and  output  growth  rates,  and,  of course,  the  initial  level  of
debt.  Solvency  is assumed  to  be in  jeopardy  if the  discounted  value  of an
estimate  of minimum  current  and  future  consumption  1.evels  exceeds  current
wealth  net of foreign  debt.  This is equivalent  to calculating  the
discounted  value  of current  and  future  feasible  trade  surpluses  and
compare  that  value  with the  current  debt.
Creditworthiness  may  however  be a constraint  even if solvency  is not.
Creditworthiness  depends  on the  lenders'  perception  of a country's  ability
AND  willingness  to pay.  Therefore  creditworthiness  often imposes  tighter
constraints  than  solvency  alone.  Assessing  the  precise  limits  imposed  by
creditworthiness  constraints  is difficult  for  several  reasons.  First  of
all, it is  extremely  difficult  to assess  the  costs  of default.  Cohen
(1988)  suggests  a simple  approach  to this  problem,  by observi,ng  that,  if a
country  has not defaulted  yet, the  currer.t  debt  service  burden  must fall
short  of  whatever  the  cost of default  is.  An obvious  definition  of a
'prudent'  debt strategy  then  is any  borrowing  path that  will  not, at any
time,  raise  the  debt  service  burden  above  its  current  value.  This  may
sound  almost  tautologically  true,  but it  has important  implications.  For
example  the trade  surpluses  that  many  Latin  American  countries  had to run
after  1982 in fact  do not qualify  under  this  approach.  Clearly,  being
forced  to run trade  surpluses  of around  8% of GNP raises  the  burden14
associated  with the  current  level  of external  debt  and  so might  trigger
default.  We thus define  unsustainable  debt finance  as any  debt  policy  th-t
implies  debt issue  at a rate in excess  of the  growth  rate  of the  resources
available  for  eventual  debt service.  This is in fact  a more stringent
requirement  than solvency  if the  real interest  rate  exceeds  the  real
growth  rate  of the  economy.
If we take  domestic  output  y as the  resource  base concept  for  foreign
and  domestic  debt,  we obtain  the following  restrictions  on debt issue:
(5)  b  - nb,  b  -nfa  -n(b  *nfa)
n  is the  growth  rate  of y.
We define  a consistent  fiscal  policy  as a  policy  that  can  be
sustained  over the  medium  term  without  compromising  any  other
macroeconomic  target  and  without  reliance  on unsustainable  debt finance.
We can,  with this  definition,  insert  the  restrictions  on debt issue  (5)
into  equ. (2);  expressing  variables  as percentages  of GDP then  yields  the
following  expression  for  the  deficit  reduction  required  for  consistency,
rar (also  expressed  as a share  of GDP):
*  A 
(6)  rar  - (a  +  rb  +  (r +  e)(b  - nfa  )e)
_  *  _  *  _ 
- (nb  +  n(b -nfa  )  +  nm +  Pm)
A  "n_  above  a variable  indicates  the  variable  is  expressed  as a share  of
GDP. rar  equals  the  actual  deficit  inclusive  of real interest  payments  on15
foreign  and  domestic  debt,  minus  the financeable  deficit,  (nb  +
nR(b -nfa*)  + nm + Pmn). A deficit  reduction  equal  to rdr  will  bring  fiscal
deficits  in line  with other  macroeconomic  targets  in the  sense  defined
before.  Alternatively,  (6)  can  be used to calculate  "sustainable"
inflation  rates.  In that  case one  simply  equates  rdr to the  actual
deficit,  and  solves  for  the inflation  rate  that  restores  equality  between
that  value  and the  right  hand side  of (6)  2/.  Such  an exercise  faces  a
problem  of multiple  solutions  if the  functional  form  of the  asset  demand
functions  implies  a dependence  of the interest  elasticity  on inflation  or
nominal  interest  rates.  An example  where this  occurs  is the
semi-logarithmic  equation.  This  problem  need  not concern  us here since  it
clearly  does  not arise  if (6)  is  used,  as is  done in this  paper,  to derive
a sustainable  deficit  for  given  inflation  targets  rather  than the  other
way around.
Clearly,  under  a debt-output  rule,  a real  depreciation  (e>O)
increases  the rar,  ie reduces  the  room for  fiscal  expansion.  But this  will
in  general  not  be the  case if exports  are  chosen  as benchmark.  Under a
debt-export  rule, (6)  becomes:
(7)  rdr  - (d  + rb + (r  + e)(b  - nfa )e)
- nb + nX(b -nfa)  + nm + Pm)
- (d  + rb + r (b  -nfa  )e  - (nb  + eY* n  n(  f)
A  _X*  A_*  .-
+ (n  + P)m)  + ( 1  ee  )  e(b  - nfa )e
2See  Melnick  and Sokoler  (1984)  for  an exercise  along  such lines.16
Under  this rule,  real  depreciation  will relax  the  fiscal  adjustment
requirement  if the  export  elasticity  with respect  to the real  exchange
rate  exceeds  one.
Cohen (1988)  has argued  that  the  proper  resource  base  ought to  be a
weighted  average  of GDP and  exports,  with the  weights  chosen  in such a  way
that the  resulting  ratio is insensitive  to the  real  exchange  rate.  The
actual  chcice  does  not  matter  too  much unless  changes  in  the real  exchange
rate  are anticipated.  In the  empirical  application  presented  below,  we use
the  Cohen  approach  (see  Anand  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1988)  for  details  on the
derivation  of the  weights).
3  EmDirical  Preliminaries:  The Structure  of Money  Demand  in  Turkev
Reserve  money  consists  of currency  in circulation  and reserves  held
by the  commercial  banks  against  demand  and time  deposits.  To derive  demand
for  base money  we therefore  estimate  asset  demand  functions  describing  the
private  sector's  portfolio  choice  over  currency,  demand  deposits  and  time
deposits  as a function  of inflation,  income  and interes3t  rates.  All data
on  prices  and  financial  assets  are taken  from  the  Monthly  Bulletin  of the
Central  Bank of Turkey;  real  output  data  are from  International  Financial
Statistics  (IMF,  various  issues).  All equations  are  estimated  using  OLS.
Consider  demand  for  currency  first.
(8)  log(C  Ut/CPIt)  3.58  +  0.57log(yt)  - 0.69iTD,t  - 1.07iDD,t
(3.10)  (2.42)  (3.67)  (3.01)
- 1.51 Pe  +  0.28  log(Cu  t/CPIt-)17
(3.79)  (1.77)
2 R -0.83  DW-2.08  Sample  Period:1977.I-1986.IV
A th Pt, the  proxy for  expected  inflation,  is approximated  by the  forecasts  of
an univariate  VAR of inflation  on its  own past  values.  The results  are
reasonable,  with all the  coefficients  of the  right  sign and  almost  all
highly  significantly  different  from  zero.  Seasonal  dummies  were also
included  but their  coefficients  are  not reported  here.  Adjustment  is
quick,  with a mean lag  of less  than 5  months  (1/(1-0.28)  quarter).
A similar  equation  for  demand  deposits  yields  the following  results:
(9)  log(DDt/CPIt) - 8.90 - 0.55 log(yt) - 0.96 iTD,t +  0.60 iDD
(6.71)  (2.86)  (7.97)  (1.30)
- 2.16 Pe +  0.24 log(DDT  /CPIT
(7.83)  (2.67)
R2-0.98  DW-1.85  Sample  Period:1977.I-1986.IV
Again  a reasonable  equation,  with a relatively  high adjustment  speed  and
strong  sensitivity  to interest  rates  and  expected  inflation.
Applied  to time  deposits,  the  portfolio  approach  yields:
(10)  log(TDt/CPIt) - 1.30 +  0.28 log(yt) +  1.18 iTD t + 0.38 iDD,t
(1.94)  (1.02)  (4.61)  (1.21)18
- 1.41  Pe + 0.68 log(TDt /CPIt )
(2.41)  (7.48)
R2-O.99  DW-l.90  Sample  Period:1977.I-1986.IV
The equation  shows  strong  sensitivity  with respect  to the  own
interest  rate iTD  t and to  expected  inflation.  The coefficient  of the
interest  paid on demand  deposits  is insignificant,  low  and of the  wrong
sign.  Reestimating  the  equation  excluding  this  variable  yields:
(11)  log(TD  /CPIt)  - 1.34  +  0.12 log(y  )  +  0.98 i  - 1.02  P9
t  t  ~  ~~~t  TD,t  t
(1.98)  (0.51)  (5.04)  (2.09)
+  0.76 log(TDt-l/CPIt-l)
(11.7)
R2-0.99  DW-l.90  Sample  Period:1977.I-1986.IV
4  An Empirical  Anpilication:  Deficits.  Financial  Sector  Reform  and
Inflation  in  Turkey.
In Section  4.1  we use the  framework  presented  above  to assess  the
consistency  of fiscal  deficits  with other  macroeconomic  targets  for
Turkey.  Section  4.2  discusses  the  consequences  of postponing  fiscal
adjustment  and studies  the interrelation  between  domestic  debt issue,
monetization  and  current  and future  inflation We then  use the  model  to
assess  the fiscal  impact  of financial  reforms  in Section  4.3. Finally19
Section  4.4 looks  at the impact  of the  size  and  cost  of foreign  debt on
the  budget,  and the  fiscal  implication  of debt-substitution  policies  where
external debt is in effect "swapped" for internal debt.
4.1  Inflation  and the  Consistency  of Fiscal  Policy
The results  are summarized  in  Tables  1 and  2. Underlying  these  tables
are  various  targets  and  assumptions.  First,  a 6 percent  real growth  rate
of GNP. Second,  the  reserve  requirements  and  nominal  interest  rates  on
demand  and  time deposits  prevailing  at the  end of 1987 are  used.  As to
liquidity  requirements,  only the  part over  which  no interest  is paid is
included  in the  definition  of base  money.
Table  1 assesses  potential  revenues  from  seignorage  and the inflation
tax  for  various  inflation  rates.  The table  first  lists  demand  for
currency,  demand  deposits  and time  deposits  for  various  inflation  rates;
these  asset  demands  are  derived  using  the  empirical  results  of Section
3.1  and the  model  presented  in Section  2.  These  are then  used to  calculate
demand  for  base  money  as a function  of reserve  requirements  and the
liquidity  ratio.  In the  next column,  inflation  tax  revenue  is  presented,
while the  final  column  lists  total  revenue  from  monetization.  Total  demand
for  base money,  the  table  shows,  is sensitive  to inflation.  It falls  from
7.8%  of GNP at 15% inflation  to 5.9%  at 60% inflation. It is clear  from
the  next column  that  higher  inflation  leads  to  higher  revenue  from
inflation  tax,  be it at a declining  rate.  However,  the  marginal  increase
in inflation  tax revenue  becomes  less  and less  as inflation  rises;  at 200%
inflation  (not  shown  in the  table)  inflation  tax  reaches  its  maximum
value.  Total  revenue  from  monetization  also rises,  although  at a slightly20
lower  rate,  because  the second  component,  seignorage,  actually  declines  as
inflation  rises.  This is  a negligible  effect,  however.
TABLE  1: INFLATION  TAX  AND SEIGNORAGE  AT VARIOUS  INFLATION  RATES
(percent  of GNP)
Inflation  Demand  for:  Inflation  Monetization
Cash  Deposits  Tax Revenues
Demand  Time
15  3.0  7.5  17.5  1.0  1.4
20  2.9  7.3  16.7  1.2  1.6
30  2.8  6.9  15.3  1.6  2.0
40  2.7  6.5  14.1  2.0  2.3
50  2.6  6.1  13.0  2.2  2.6
60  2.5  5.8  12.1  2.5  2.8
This analysis  covers  one  source  of financing,  monetization.  In
addition  there  is domestic  debt issue  and foreign  borrowing.  Under the
assumption  of a 6% real  output  growth,  the  government  can  borrow  2.5%  of
GNP a  year without  seeing  its (foreign)  debt output  ratio  increase.
Furthermore  we assume  that  all the  additional  foreign  exchange  is
available  to the  government.  This is  probably  reasonable,  as not  much
private  sector  foreign  borrowing  is  expected  other  than  inflows  into  the
commercial  banking  system  through  foreign  exchange  deposits  owned  by
non-residents. These  are in any  case  better  seen  as remittances  in
disguise  and  should  possibly  be counted  as above  the  line  inflows  rather21
than  capital  account  transactions.
For  domestic  debt  we assume  that  debt issue  is restricted  to whatever
is  compatible  with maintaining  the  debt-output  ratio  constant.  The reason
for  not allowing  a faster  rate  of domestic  debt issue  is the  high real
rate it carries.  At 12%  a  year it is  well above  the  growth  rate  of the
economy. At this  rate,  debt-service  costs  would  escalate  as a  percentage
of GNP if  more extensive  use is made  of debt-issue  to finance  the  deficit.
Table 2 shows,  first  of all, the  financeable  deficit  as a function  of
the inflation  rate.  It arrives  at that  measure  by adding  up the three
sources  of financing:  monetization,  domestic  debt issue  and foreign
borrowing.  A target  inflation  rate  of 50%,  close  to the
year-end-to-year-end  inflation  rate in 1987,  allows  a deficit  of 6% of
GDP.  A target  of 20%  would  allow  a deficit  of 4.8%  only.
TABLE  2  FINANCEABLE  DEFICIT  FOR  VARIOUS  INFLATION  TARGETS
(percent  of GDP)
Inflation  Financeable  Actual  Required
Rate  Deficit  Deficit  Deficit
in 1986  Reduction  (rdr)
15  4.4  5.7  1.3
20  4.6  5.7  1.5
30  5.0  5.7  0.7
40  5.3  5.7  0.4
50  5.6  5.7  0.1
60  5.8  5.7  -0.122
The next  column  shows  the  actual  real  deficit  in 1986.  If the  actual
deficit  is  subtracted  from  the  financeable  deficit,  one arrives  at the
Required  Deficit  Reduction  (rar).  This is the  reduction  necessary  for
consistency  with the  corresponding  inflation  rate.  rar  equals  1,1%  for an
inflation  target  of 20%,  but is  essentially  zero for  a 50% inflation
target.  In that sense,  50%  can  be considered  as the  equilibrium  inflation
rate,  given  the 1986  fiscal  stance  and  financial  structure
4.2  Domestic  Debt,  Money  Creation  and  the  Trade-off  between  Current  and
Future  Inflation.
The  previous  Section  discussed  the  fiscal  adjustment  necessary  to
achieve  a given  inflation  target.  The same  tables  could  be used to derive,
instead,  the  inflation  rate  compatible  with no fiscal  adjustment,  given
the  current  fiscal  deficit.  The  cuWrent  Section  takes  a different
approach.  What if  adjustment  takes  rlace,  but not instantaneously?  In
particular,  what  happens  if the  govzrnment  pursues  the  monetary  policy
necessary  to sustain  a given  inflation  rate,  fails  to make the  required
deficit  reduction  and  covers  the  resulting  gap through  debt issue?  This in
effect  constitutes  a debt  substitution  policy,  similar  to .- ,e  one that  is
discussed  in the  original  Sargent-Wallace  (1982)  paper.  Consider  a policy.
of strict  adherence  to monetary  policy  consistent  with inflation  targets
of say  the 1987  rate  of 20%.  But instead  of making  the required  deficit
reduction,  the  government  issues  interest  bearing  debt to  cover  the
remaining  financing  gap.
Monetization  implies  debt issue  at zero  nominal  rate,  so such  a
policy  of substituting  interest  bearing  debt to replace  revenue  from23
monetization  will deteriorate  the  government's  fiscal  position.  Figure  1
demonstrates  the  consequences.  The  base line  in the  diagram  (labeled
"Adjustment  now")  shows  the inflation/deficit-reduction  trade-off  just
discussed  in Section  4.1.  The figure  gives  the  amount  of fiscal
adjustment  necessary  (listed  on the  vertical  axis; the  benchmark  is 1986,
in  which  year the  real  deficit  was 5.7  percent  of GNP) for  given  inflation
rates  (listed  on the  horizontal  axis). The line  cuts  the axis  at 50%,
indicating  that for  that inflation  target,  the  fiscal  policy  stance  in
1986  required  no further  adjustment.  In  that  sense,  50%  was the
equilibrium  inflation  rate in that  year.
The second  line in the  graph  shows  how the  trade-off  shifts  in  an
unfavorable  direction  if adjustment  is postponed.  The line,  labeled
"Adj.after  six  years",  shows  the  additional  fiscal  adjustment  necessary,
or,  alternatively,  the  increase  in  equilibrium  inflation  if no adjustment
is taken.  This line  cuts the  inflation  axis at a rate in  excess  of 80
percent,  an increase  of 30  percentage  points.
FIGURE  1  HERE
4.3  Fiscal  Implications  of Financial  rector  Policies.
Financial  sector  reforms  are  usually  undertaken  with  microeconomic
efficiency  as a  predominating  motivating  factor.  Advice  to lower  reserve
requirements  is a good  example.  The objective  is to lower  the  wedge
between  lending  and  borrowing  rates  of the  commercial  banking  system.  At
the  same time,  such  measures  have a direct  impact  on aggregate  demand  for
reserve  money  and  hence  on the  basis  over  which  the inflation  tax is24
levied.  This in turn implies  that  they  have implications  for  the fiscal
deficit  that  is consistent  with inflation  targets,  or,  alternatively,  the
inflation  rate that  will prevail  eventually  if no fiscal  adjustment  takes
place.  A fiscal  deficit  that  was consistent  with other  macroeconomic
targets  before  the  reform  may  not be consistent  anymore  once  the  reform
has  been implemented.  The  model  presented  in this  paper  allows  one to
assess  the  need for  fiscal  policy  adjustment  along  with such  reforms.
Typical  experiments  one  can  perform  with the  model  would involve
changes  in reserve  requirements,  decisions  to pay interest  rates  on
reserves,  or changes  in  bank interest  rates.  We will only  consider  changes
in time  deposit  rates  here.  The impact  of deposit  rate  changes  on demand
for  reserve  money  depends  intricately  on the  structure  of private  asset
demand.  For  example  higher  time  deposit  rates  will lead  to substitution
out  of cash into  time  deposits,  thus  reducing  demand  for  base  money  by the
amount  shifted  times  one  minus  the  reserve  requirement  ratio  against  time
deposits;  they  will however  also  trigger  shifts  out  of non-monetary
assets,  with  a positive  impact  on reserve  money  demand  since  time  deposits
carry  reserve  requirements  while  non-monetary  assets  do not. The  net
effect  will depend  on the  relative  substitution  effects,  and on the level
at which  reserve  requirements  against  time  deposits  are  set (cf  van
Wijnbergen  (1982)).
Table  3 shows  that  currency  and  demand  deposits  will increase  after  a
cut in time  deposit  rates  from 56 to 35  percent,  but  much less than  time
deposits  fall.  Apparently,  a cut in time  deposit  rates  triggers  a larger
shift  into  non-monetary  assets  than into  currency  in  circulation  or demand
deposits.  Thus base  money  demand  declines.  The empirical  evidence  thus
suggests  that  the  second  effect  mentioned  in the  previous  paragraph25
dominates,  at least  for  the  current  level  of reserve  requirements  on time
deposits  (van  Wijnbergen  (  1984)  reports  similar  results  for  South  Korea).
As a result,  inflation  tax  revenues  will decline  at any given  inflation
rate  once  monetary  equilibrium  is restored.  Therefore,  the  required
deficit  reduction,  "rdr",  necessary  to achieve  a target  inflation  rate  of
35%  increases  from -0.9  percent  of GNP to 1.1%.
TABLE  4  TIME DEPOSIT  RATES  AND BASE  MONEY  DEMAND
Time Deposit  Rate:  56%  35%
Cash  3.1  3.7
Demand  deposits  7.3  9.6
Time deposits  19.5  8.4
Total  Base  Money  7.1  6.4
Note:  Asset demands  are  expressed  as a percentage  of CDP; they  are
evaluated  at 35%  inflation  and  a demand  deposit  rate of 10%.
Alternatively,  look  at the inflation  rate  that  will  make any deficit
reduction  unnecessary.  Before  the  cut in  deposit  rates,  this  equilibrium
inflation  rate (equilibrium,  that  is,  for  given  inflation  rate)  equaled  50
percent,  as we saw  in Table  3.  After  the  cut in interest  rates  this
equilibrium  inflation  rate increases  to almost  85 percent.  The large
increase  in equilibrium  inflation  for  such  a small  increase  in  rdr
reflects  the  fact that  at inflation  rates  close  to triple  digits,  money
demand  becomes  highly  elastic.  As a consequence,  the  additional  revenue
from  higher  inflation  declines  rapidly  as inflation  itself  rises.  This26
necessitates  bigger  and  bigger  increases  in inflation  to cover  a given
increase  in revenue  requirements  as base level  inflation  increases.
Changes  in demand  deposit  rates  would  have an even  bigger  impact,  since
demand  deposits  are  closer  money  substitutes  than  time  deposit.;.
It is important  realise  that  these  results  do not tell  us whether
financial  sector  reform  is  desirable  or  not,  but rather  to what  extent
accompanying  fiscal  policy  adjustment  is  necessary.  Furthermore,  we do  not
address  the  short  term  macroeconomic  effects  of changes  in demand  for  base
money  given  the  supply  of base  money.  With  perfect  capital  mobility  and a
fixed  exchange  rate,  capital  inflows  from  abroad  will immediately  resolve
any  discrepancy  between  money  dentand  and  money  supply.  If capital  mobility
is  less than  perfect,  however,  such  an increase  of  base money  demand  ovet
base money  supply  may  have a recessionary  impact  until  price  levels  or
reserve  changes  resolve  any  remaining  imbalance  between  money  demand  and
supply.
4.4  External  Debt,  Foreign  Interest  Rates  and  Sustainable  Inflation
In this  section  we report  on two  experiments.  First,  we show the
impact  of foreign  real interest  rates,  for  a fixed  level  of foreign  debt,
on sustainable  inflation  and the  consistency  of fiscal  deficits  with any
given  inflation  targets.  We then  analyse  the  consequences  of "debt
substitution":  repaying  foreign  debt  not  by running  a matching  domestic
fiscal  surplus,  (  or reduced  deficit),  but  by the  issue  of additional
domestic  public  sector  debt.  The  latter  policy  has  been pursued
extensively  in  many Latin  American  debtors  (Cohen  ( 1988)).
Consider  first  the impact  of real interest  rates  on public  sector27
foreign  debt.  Figure  2 summarizes  the  results.  The first  experiment  is  a
hypothetical  return  to the  admittedly  ur.,ustainable  late 1970s  with zero
real interest  rates  on foreign  debt.  The results  are summarized  by line
RFO in Figure  2. This line indicates  that  at a zero foreign  real interest
rate,  no adjustment  is  necessary  for  any (positive)  inflation  rate.  If
such a reduction  in  real rates  would take  place,  the  financeable  deficit
would  exceed  the  actual  1986  deficit  for  any  positive  inflation  target.
The figure  also  shows  the  consequences  of an increase  in real
interest  rates  to 8 percent  (the  line labeled  RF8 in  figure  2).  Clearly,
such an increase  in real interest  rates,  if sustained,  would  push  Turkey
in  Latin-America  level  inflation  rates  if  no additional  fiscal  measures
were taken.  The intersection  point  shifts  to 150  percent,  indicating  that
the  equilibrium  inflation  rate  more than  doubles  in that  case.  The figure
also  shows  another  feature  of the relation  between  fiscal  policy  and
inflation.  At inflation  rates  substantially  above  200%,  the  rar line
starts  sloping  upward:  at rates  that  high, increased  inflation  requires
more rather  than less  fiscal  adjustment.  This is  due to the  fact that  the
maximum  revenue  from  inflation  tax  in  Turkey  is  reached  at somewhat  above
200  percent  inflation  a  year.  At higher  inflation  rates,  the  demand  for
base money  declines  so fast  when inflation  rises,  that  total  inflation  tax
revenue  actually  falls,  the  higher  inflation  rate  notwithstanding.  As a
consequence,  the  rdr  becomes  a rising  rather  than  a declining  function  of
inflation  if the inflation  rate  exceeds  200  percent  a year.  We assume  that
the  government  follows  money  growth  rules  that  will keep the  economy  at
the  lower  rather  than the  higher  rate  equilibrium.
FIG 2 HERE28
Consider  next the  debt substitution  experiment.  Under  this
experiment,  the  government  retires  foreign  debt equal  to 10  percent  of GNP
and  raises  the  revenue  by issuing  an equivalent  amount  of interest  bearing
debt domestically.  This  clearly  deteriorates  its  fiscal  position,  since
the  real interest  cost  of domestic  debt is  6 percentage  points  higher  ( 12
instead  of 6) than  the  cost  of foreign  debt.  Such  a policy  would increase
the  equilibrium  inflation  rate to over 150% . Clearly,  at current  interest
rate differentials,  a  policy  of retiring  foreign  public  debt through  issue
of domestic  debt  will in fact  deteriorate  the  fiscal  position  of the
government.
5  Conclusions
We have designed  a simple  framework  for  the  assessment  of the
consistency  between  fiscal  policy  and the  requirements  imposed  by
financial  sector  reform,  external  debt and  medium  run  inflation  targets.
The framework  draws  on the  public  finance  approach  to inflation  pioneered
by Phelps  (1973)  and is  designed  with practical  application  in  mind.  The
approach  has relatively  modest  data  requirements  because  of its focus  on
consistency  rather  than  on intertemporal  optimality.  The design  of an
intertemporally  optimal  fiscal  policy  requires  information  about
parameters  such  as the  intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution,  about
which  we do  not even  have  ball park  estimates.  Data  requirements  for
application  of the framework  set  up here  do not exceed  routinely  available
financial  sector  and  national  accounts  data.  Extra  effort  is  required,
however,  in  obtaining  detailed  information  about  the  regulatory  framework
for the  financial  sector  and  about  the  size  of th'e  actual  deficit  of the29
public  sector.  The latter  is  defined  in a comprehensive  manner,  in
particular  inclusive  of the  Central  Bank's  profit  and loss  account.
We demonstrate  the  usefulness  of the  model  by using  it in an
empirical  analysis  of the implications  of financial  sector  reform,
inflation  targets  and  external  debt  strategies  for  fiscal  policy  in
Turkey.  The application  demonstrates,  we hope,  the  usefulness  of this
approach  for  the  analysis  of the  interactions  between  external  debt  and
foreign  interest  rates,  domestic  debt  servicing  costs,  fiscal  policy  and
the  sustainability  of medium  run inflation  targets.  In addition,  we
applied  the  model to  an analysis  of the  fiscal  implications  of financial
sector  reform  measures,  showing  the  importance  of such  measures  for  fiscal
policy  and  the sustainability  of medium  run  inflation  targets.
Many extensions  are  possible.  Introducing  explicit  dynamics  in the
financial  sector  model  would  allow  its  use in  year-to-year  financial
programming.  An even  more ambitious  extension  would  explicitly  explore  the
dynamics  of inflation  given  the  external  debt  and fiscal  policy
considerations  embedded  in this  approach,  as is done in Sargent  and
Wallace  (1982).  This would  however  require  a much  more substantial
modeling  effort,  and  would  again  lead  to much  more demanding  data
requirements,  thus  jeopardizing  empirical  applicability.
The  model  was designed  to provide  an easily  applicable  quantitative
framework,  of potential  use In different  countries  without  requiring  too
much of an effort  for  country-to-country  transfer.  We hope that the
analysis  of Turkey  presented  here,  apart  from  being  of interest  in its  own
right,  also  demonstrates  that  the  current  version  is a useful  step in that
direction.30
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